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A WAVERING COMMITMENT? ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE 
AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN ONTARIO’S 
ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION 
 
Laverne Jacobs 
 
In December 2009, the Ontario Legislative Assembly enacted the 
Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and 
Appointments Act, 2009 [ATAGAA]. This new legislation offers a 
unique approach to ensuring that adjudicative tribunals in the province are 
transparent, accountable and efficient in their operations while preserving their 
decision-making independence.  This approach aims to bring the executive 
branch of government and tribunals together in achieving effective and 
accountable internal tribunal governance.  Through the use of illustrative cases, 
the author argues, however, that the statute does not address many of the 
contemporary concerns about administrative independence and accountability 
that tribunals experience on the ground. She argues further that the legislation 
is inconsistent in its underlying commitment to the concept of accountability 
itself as it fails to contemplate the importance of government accountability to 
tribunals and overlooks opportunities to foster sustained internal cultures of 
accountability. Finally, the approach taken by the legislation must be 
channeled properly to avoid disintegrating from one of collaborative governance 
to one of command and control. 
 
En décembre 2009, l’Assemblée législative de l’Ontario a adopté la Loi de 
2009 sur la responsabilisation et la gouvernance des tribunaux décisionnels et 
les nominations à ces tribunaux. Cette nouvelle loi présente une approche tout 
à fait particulière pour assurer que les tribunaux décisionnels de la province 
sont transparents, tenus de rendre compte et efficaces dans leur fonctionnement 
tout en préservant leur indépendance décisionnelle. Cette approche vise à 
rapprocher l’autorité exécutive du gouvernement et les tribunaux pour en 
arriver à une gouvernance interne efficace et responsable des tribunaux. En 
utilisant des cas pour l’illustrer, l’auteure soutient, toutefois, que la loi 
n’aborde pas plusieurs des préoccupations contemporaines au sujet de 
l’indépendance administrative et l’obligation de rendre compte dont les 
tribunaux font l’expérience sur le terrain. Elle soutient de plus que la loi est 
inconsistante dans son engagement sous-jacent envers le concept lui-même de 
l’obligation de rendre compte puisqu’elle ne contemple pas l’importance de tenir 
le gouvernement responsable envers les tribunaux et néglige les occasions de 
favoriser des cultures internes soutenues de rendre compte. Finalement, 
l’approche que prend la loi doit être dirigée convenablement pour éviter de se 
                                                          
  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. An earlier version of this article was 
 presented at the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010 and at 
 the 6th Annual National Forum on Administrative Law and Practice, Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
 University, October 18-19, 2010. I am grateful to the participants of the two conferences for their 
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désintégrer d’une approche de gouvernance collaborative en une de 
commandement et de contrôle. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 20091 
[ATAGAA] forms part of a modernization initiative of the current Ontario Liberal 
government. This initiative aims to strengthen Ontario's laws, regulations and systems 
by increasing transparency, accountability and efficiency within the province without 
compromising administrative independence.2 The statute is unique in Canada.  
Ontario is the only jurisdiction that has attempted to address the major public 
concerns about the accountability of administrative tribunals through one 
comprehensive, tailored statute.3 
 This paper offers a critique of ATAGAA. Through it, I suggest that the 
legislation has opened the door to certain avenues of ensuring accountability that are 
potentially quite promising. Specifically, the statute shows an approach to tribunal 
governance that is collaborative in nature, by providing room for input on a range of 
tribunal accountability matters from the tribunals that are being governed.   
ATAGAA fails, nevertheless, to address many critical contemporary concerns 
relating to tribunal accountability and independence, especially those regarding the 
accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative tribunals to 
ensure that the public is adequately served. Of equal concern is that ATAGAA 
presents an underlying philosophy to accountability that is inconsistent. Despite its 
attempt at promoting a collaborative governance approach, the statute tends to 
favour the idea of enforcing accountability from the outside rather than fostering 
elements of internal tribunal culture that could lead to more authentic and durable 
measures of accountability. 
 This paper proceeds in three parts.  Part II provides an overview of ATAGAA, 
highlighting its most salient aspects. Accountability and independence are often 
interwoven in Canadian administrative law. Because their relationship is at the heart 
of the discussion in this paper, Part III defines these two concepts and discusses the 
connection between them, placing them within the broader context of the Canadian 
administrative state. Part IV outlines some of the most significant concerns about 
administrative accountability that have surfaced in Canadian legal academic literature 
and recent case law.  In this part, I take a focused look at ATAGAA. I examine the 
                                                          
1  S.O. 2009, c. 33 Schedule 5 [“ATAGAA,” “the Act”].  ATAGAA received Royal assent on 
 December 15, 2009.  It has been coming into force in stages since then. At the time of writing, only
 the provisions relating to clustering had come into force and no general proclamation date had been 
 set for the rest of the provisions. 
2  See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ontario Hansard, 179 (27 October 2009) at 1520 (Hon.  
 Christopher Bentley). See also Ontario Attorney General, Press Release, “McGuinty Government 
 Increasing Transparency, Accountability And Effectiveness,” (October 27 2009) online: Government 
 of Ontario <http://www.news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2009/10/modernizing-provincial-laws.html>.  
 See also ATAGAA, ibid. s. 1. 
3  This is not to discount the existence of other statutes in Canada that address, as part of a larger 
 collection of administrative law issues, specific questions of accountability. Of note is Québec's An act 
 respecting administrative justice, RSQ 1998 c J-3, which speaks to certain questions of ethics and 
 accountability. In particular, Title III, ss. 165 – 198, deals with the establishment of a council (Le 
 Conseil de la Justice Administrative) that is responsible for creating a code of ethics for members of the 
 Administrative Tribunal of Québec, for receiving and investigating complaints against members of 
 the Tribunal and for examining issues constituting a lapse in the exercise of administrative office 
 which may lead to the removal of Tribunal members or the Tribunal’s President. 
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statute’s possibilities and limitations with respect to its ability to address 
contemporary concerns about accountability without encroaching on the equally 
important value of administrative independence. 
 
II. ATAGAA: - AN OVERVIEW    
 
 Outside of provisions dedicated to introductory and general matters, ATAGAA 
addresses the following four main topics:4  a) the creation of public accountability 
documents by adjudicative tribunals and amendments to these documents, b) the 
creation of governance accountability documents by adjudicative tribunals, c) 
ensuring merit-based appointments and d) adjudicative tribunal clustering.   The 
following is an overview of how the legislation deals with each of these four topics.  
Overall, one sees a definite shift towards a sharing of governance between the 
executive branch of government and adjudicative tribunals.  This is a positive step:  if 
properly channelled, it can open the door to allowing for input by a broader spectrum 
of interests including those of the adjudicative tribunals involved and through them, 
their users.  At the same time, the collaborative governance approach taken by the 
legislation evidences important gaps that may have an impact on its effectiveness. 
 
A. Public Accountability Documents  
 The Public Accountability Documents part of the statute is dedicated to the 
public face of the adjudicative tribunal. It is concerned with: how the tribunal will 
conduct itself on a day-to-day basis with the public it serves, how it will handle public 
complaints, its mission and mandate statements, its ethics plan, and its financial, 
staffing and training arrangements.   These are issues that affect public confidence in 
how efficiently an administrative tribunal will function and, more indirectly, in the 
tribunal’s adjudicative capacity.  
 Under ATAGAA, every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a mandate 
statement and a mission statement, both of which must be approved by the tribunal's 
responsible minister. However, there is no definition of these statements, no specific 
content identified for inclusion and there are no guidelines for developing them. 
Similar provisions are outlined for: 
 
 the tribunal  to create a policy for consultation with the 
public when changing its rules or policies;5  
 the creation of a service standard policy which indicates 
the tribunal’s intended standard of service and the 
process for making and responding to complaints about 
tribunal service;6  
                                                          
4  Although it addresses only four main topics, ATAGAA comprises six parts. These six parts are:   
 "Public Accountability Documents" (ss.  3 - 7); "Publication, Amendment and Review of Public 
 Accountability Documents” (ss. 8-10); "Governance Accountability Documents" (ss. 11 - 13); 
 "Appointment to Adjudicative Tribunals" (s. 14); “Tribunal Clustering" (ss. 15 - 19) and "General 
 Matters" (ss. 20 - 22). The legislation ends with a section entitled "Regulations"(ss. 23-25), in which 
 one finds provisions dedicated to the creation of regulations by the Lieutenant Governor in Council 
 and to housekeeping matters such as the coming into force date and short title.  The statute, which is 
 short,  can be accessed online: Service Ontario e-laws <http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/ statutes/ 
 english/elaws_statutes_09a33_e.htm>. 
5  ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 4. 
6  Ibid at s. 5. 
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 the development of an ethics plan, which must be 
approved by the public service’s Conflict of Interest 
Commissioner;7 and  
 the establishment of a member accountability 
framework.8  
 
 The last of these, the member accountability framework, would appear to be one 
of the most onerous statements to prepare.  It requires the tribunal to provide a 
description of the functions of all members, vice-chairs and the chair of the tribunal, 
their skills, knowledge, experience, other attributes and qualifications and that it 
create a code of conduct for tribunal members.   It does not specify what will happen 
if the code of conduct is breached. It is possible that the tribunal may create its own 
sanctions, but this is not clear from the statute. The code of conduct requirement is 
revisited more closely below. 
 Once drafted, all documents created under the Public Accountability Documents 
portion of the statute can be amended by the tribunal and must be reviewed every 
three years by the tribunal to determine if amendments are required.9 The Public 
Accountability Documents part of the statute does not provide explicit rationales or 
discussion of the underlying goals to be satisfied by each of the various documents 
required. This is unfortunate as it may render the experience of creating these 
documents a chore, delegated to the administrative management of the tribunal, 
rather than a consensus-building exercise among the members and staff of the 
tribunal. 
 
B. Governance Accountability Documents 
 The Governance Accountability Documents provisions of the statute deal with 
the development of memoranda of understanding between the tribunal and its 
responsible minister, as well as the creation of business plans and annual reports. 
ATAGAA requires every adjudicative tribunal to enter into a memorandum of 
understanding with its responsible minister.10  The memorandum should address both 
the tribunal’s internal governance matters and its external relationship with the 
responsible minister.  With respect to internal matters, the memoranda aim to seek 
agreement between tribunal and minister on questions relating to the financial, 
staffing and administrative arrangements, committee structure and the recruitment 
and training of tribunal members.11  Such issues are typically left to the discretion of 
the administrative tribunal. Problems can arise, however, if the executive branch of 
government interjects without welcome on the tribunal’s understanding of how to do 
things best.  One can therefore see how maintaining a pre-established set of guiding 
norms through a memorandum of understanding can be useful in navigating or 
avoiding conflicts between tribunals and the executive branch of government.  As for 
the tribunal's external relationship with its responsible minister, ATAGAA merely 
specifies that the accountability relationships of the tribunal, including its duty to 
                                                          
7  Ibid at s. 6. 
8 Ibid at s. 7. 
9  Ibid at ss.  9, 10. 
10  Ibid at ss. 11 (1). 
11   Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (a), (c), (d). (e). 
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account to its responsible minister should be addressed in a memorandum of 
understanding.12   
 The preparation of business plans and annual reports are similarly subject to this 
part of the statute.  Every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a business plan 
for the public, the contents of which will be prescribed and/or found in a directive of 
the Management Board of Cabinet13 (a committee of the Executive Council which is 
charged with efficient running of the public service in the province14).  As for annual 
reports, ATAGAA sets out the timeframe within which annual reports must be 
submitted to the tribunal's responsible minister, indicates their contents and that they 
will be tabled in the Legislative Assembly.15 Interestingly, the executive branch of 
government, by way of the Management Board of Cabinet, is able to specify 
additional matters that should be included in almost every document to be produced 
by the tribunal in relation to public and governance accountability under the statute.   
 
C. Appointments to Adjudicative Tribunals 
 Undoubtedly in response to persistent concerns about partisanship appointments 
in the administrative justice system, this part of the statute outlines criteria for 
ensuring meritorious appointments to adjudicative tribunals.  Candidates will be 
assessed for any tribunal-specific qualifications indicated in enabling legislation, as 
well as for their experience and knowledge of the law and subject matter, their 
aptitude for impartial adjudication and their aptitude for applying any alternative 
adjudicative practices and procedures that may be set out in the tribunal's rules.  The 
recruitment requirements and selection process will be made public.16 The chair of the 
tribunal will be consulted for his or her assessment of a candidate’s qualifications and 
recommendation of appointment.  The chair also plays a prominent role in 
reappointments:  he or she will be consulted for an evaluation of current members’ 
                                                          
12  Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (b). 
13  Ibid at s. 12. 
14  See Management Board of Cabinet Act, RSO 1990, c M.1 [Management Board of Cabinet Act]. The main 
 purpose of the Management Board of Cabinet is to ensure the efficient operation of the public 
 service in Ontario. The duties of the Management Board of Cabinet are: a) to approve organization 
 and staff establishments in any part of the public service; b) to establish, prescribe or regulate any 
 policies and procedures that the Board considers necessary for the efficient and effective operation of 
 any part of the public service; c) to initiate and supervise the development of management practices 
 and systems for the efficient operation of any part of the public service; and d) to report to the 
 Executive Council on matters concerning general administrative policy in any part of the public 
 service, either on its own initiative or because the matter has been referred to it by the Executive 
 Council  (See Management Board of Cabinet Act, ss. 3(1)). The public service is defined broadly to 
 include all Ministries, Crown agencies, corporations owned, operated or controlled by the Crown and 
 all other boards, commissions, authorities or unincorporated bodies of the Crown. Administrative 
 tribunals are generally understood to be independent of the Crown, and at arm’s length from 
 central government (which would include ministries of the executive), it is therefore unusual that 
 Management Board, which is fundamentally responsible for Crown operations, would be responsible 
 for creating the directives to guide administrative tribunals in this context. One can certainly surmise 
 that there may be important differences in the way that the regular public service and an arm’s 
 length administrative tribunal deal with many of the matters over which Management Board of 
 Cabinet has directive making power. These matters include tribunal mandate and mission 
 statements, public consultation policies, service standard policies, ethics plans and member 
 accountability frameworks.   
15  ATAGAA also indicates that if there is a conflict between it and another statute respecting the 
 tabling of annual reports for a particular tribunal, the tribunal-specific statute should prevail.  See 
 ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 13. 
16  See Ibid at s. 14. 
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performance of duties and reappointments will only be made upon the chair's 
recommendation.17     
 
D. Tribunal Clustering 
 The idea for tribunal “clustering” in Ontario first emerged as part of a study done 
in 2007 sponsored by the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services. 18 
"Clustering" is defined in the study as a way of sharing best practices among tribunals 
that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter.  The study sought to 
examine how tribunals could maximize their existing pools of resources to provide 
the highest level of public service while strengthening individual tribunal mandates.  
While clustering is not a means of merging or integrating different tribunals into one 
generic agency and although the aim is not cost-cutting, clustering was seen to be a 
valuable tool for preserving scarce public resources while retaining specialized 
expertise.  The study looked into the feasibility of clustering certain tribunals dealing 
with a land use. In 2009, the first tribunal cluster in Ontario was established, the 
Environment and Land Use Planning cluster. This cluster includes the Assessment 
Review Board, the Board of Negotiation, the Environmental Review Tribunal and the 
Ontario Municipal Board. 
 Through ATAGAA, the government has furthered the foundational basis of 
clustering by setting out guidelines for the designation, governance structure and 
accountability of clusters.  The statute provides that two or more adjudicative 
tribunals may be designated as a cluster if the Lieutenant Governor in Council (i.e. 
Cabinet) is of the opinion that they can operate more effectively and efficiently in that 
way.19   No consultation with the affected ministries or tribunals is contemplated in 
the Act.  The Act has provision for an executive chair to be appointed who would be 
responsible for the entire cluster, as well as for the appointment of various associate-, 
alternate- and vice-chairs.20 The executive chair possesses all of the powers, duties and 
functions of the chair of each tribunal within a cluster.21 As for accountability, the 
tribunals in a cluster are to participate jointly in the creation of the public and 
governance accountability documents required under ATAGAA.   
 
E. Challenges Arising from ATAGAA's Choice of Tools and Actors 
 With the exception of the tribunal clustering provisions, ATAGAA clearly shows 
a shift towards a shared model of governance in which both the executive branch of 
government and administrative tribunals participate in the goal of holding 
adjudicative tribunals accountable. However, the central question of whether the 
statute will accomplish its task of assuring the accountability of adjudicative tribunals 
raises doubts. There are significant gaps in the legislation that reveal conflicting 
approaches to the legislation’s underlying philosophy of collaboration. Four aspects 
of the legislation reveal its shortcomings.  These aspects all centre around the 
presence or absence of appropriate tools and agents for realizing the statute’s 
objectives.  
                                                          
17  See Ibid at ss.  14 (4). 
18  Final Report of the Agency Cluster Facilitator for the Municipal, Environment and Land Use Planning Tribunals 
 (Toronto: Agency Cluster Project, August 22, 2007) (Facilitator: Kevin Whitaker), online: 
 Ministry of Government and Consumer  Services<http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/166283 
 .pdf> [Ontario Agency Cluster Report].  
19  See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s.  15. 
20  See Ibid at ss. 16, 17. 
21  See Ibid at s. 17(1). 
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 The weaknesses in the legislature's choice of tools and agents of governance 
appear most readily in the instruments adopted for achieving accountability.  These 
instruments include the public accountability documents and the governance 
accountability documents. How exactly will the mandate and mission statements, 
consultation policies, service standard policies, and member accountability 
frameworks work to ensure that litigants, users and other concerned citizens will be 
able to hold adjudicative tribunals to account? Many of these instruments are merely 
descriptive in nature. For example, the mission statements, consultation policies, and 
member accountability frameworks primarily provide a means for the tribunal to 
outline functions, skills and policies.  Missing are tools that would allow a person 
alleging that the tribunal has not been accountable to push for some sort of corrective 
action.  It is not clear if these documents are simply bureaucratic instruments or 
whether they will provide for change. 
 Even where the legislation does provide instruments that could theoretically 
engender change, the legislation is silent as to the concrete steps that are to be used to 
move a tribunal to become more accountable.  Discussed briefly above, the 
provisions requiring adjudicative tribunals to create a code of conduct are illustrative 
of this shortcoming. Left unstated in ATAGAA is what will happen if a code of 
conduct, once developed, is breached by a tribunal member.  It may be that, in an 
effort to respect tribunal independence, the legislature has been silent, intending to 
allow each tribunal to determine whether sanctions should be imposed at all.22 If 
corrective action is contemplated, it is not clear whether the code of conduct is to 
work with sanctions enforced by an external body such as the responsible minister or 
the province’s Conflict of Interest Commissioner, or to implement penalties 
developed by the tribunal itself.  Some may argue that self-sanctioning is not an 
effective method; others may suggest that only those within the realm of expertise of 
the administrative tribunal are in a position to understand well the industry and its 
workings and to fashion effective disciplinary measures.  A final argument might be 
that the source of any type of penalty is a matter best addressed on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the nature of the tribunal and the issue in question. All of these 
options are possible but it is necessary for these and other debates to take place about 
their merits. ATAGAA does not indicate, however, if or how such discussions will fit 
into the tribunal's creation of a code of conduct; it merely indicates that a code of 
conduct must be produced.  Finally, sanctions contemplated for noncompliance with 
the code may be introduced by way of regulation.23 If the government chooses to 
create such regulations, it may be helpful for it to provide tribunals with at least some 
programmatic guidance on implementation of sanctions, after consultation with the 
tribunals concerned. 
 A third shortcoming of the legislation is found in the lack of express rationales for 
the accountability documents that ATAGAA requires.  As mentioned briefly earlier, 
                                                          
22  Legislation that provides remedial or disciplinary measures for tribunal member misconduct may, 
 alternatively, provide for an independent mechanism to deal with sanctions. Under the Canadian 
 Human Rights Act, for example, the Chair of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal may request the 
 Minister of Justice to decide if a tribunal member should be subject to remedial or disciplinary 
 measures for pre-specified issues of misconduct. The Minister of Justice’s options under the statute 
 include holding a public inquiry led by a Superior Court judge and mediation.  See the Canadian 
 Human Rights Act, R.S., 1985, c. H-6, s. 48.3. 
23  Subsections 23 (h) and 23(i) provide that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations 
 that prescribe other matters to be addressed or included in any public accountability documents or 
 governance accountability documents, and regulations that prescribe the form and format of these 
 two types of documents. 
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such rationales would be useful for any tribunal as it goes about determining how to 
reach outcomes in developing these instruments.  One would hope that the best way 
to ensure accountability would be to seize the moment when the tribunal has to think 
through its mandate, mission, service standards etc. and use this moment to foster a 
consensus-building, reflective exercise among those in the tribunal itself. This would 
be helpful in encouraging an ethos of accountability among the members of a given 
tribunal, which could lead to more durable change. If those who must be accountable 
do not have a meaningful way to engage with the underlying purpose of the 
accountability instruments they are creating, then the exercise may be a lost 
opportunity in terms of its resonance within the tribunal itself.  Explanations of why 
the various documents required are necessary may assist in fostering authentic 
dialogue within the administrative tribunals themselves and in capitalizing on 
opportunities for the development of an ethos of accountability. As it currently 
stands, the lack of express rationales comes across as top-down and formalistic, in 
sharp contradistinction to the collaborative governance philosophy of most of the 
statute. 
 It is clear that the legislature’s tools of governance leave some quizzical gaps. The 
same is also true of the choice of agents used to assure ATAGAA’s functioning.  
Every public accountability or governance accountability document that the tribunals 
are required to produce is subject to additional directives by the Management Board 
of Cabinet. Moreover, the responsible minister’s approval is required for all 
documents. These two oversight mechanisms present the opportunity for an unusual 
amount of control by the executive branch of government. Why does this possibility 
for executive control exist? One falls into a dichotomous conceptual gap in answering 
this question, as the premises animating the statute's design are difficult to identify. In 
creating this statute, was the legislature's intention to touch on matters over which it 
saw itself capable of legislating or simply to facilitate closer policing of daily tribunal 
activities in an attempt to prevent and remedy accountability gaps more quickly? 
Backed with legislative intent, both approaches may be seen to be legally valid. If the 
main goal, however, is to bring about greater scrutiny over areas that are usually 
within the administrative control of tribunals then regardless of whether it is legally 
valid, the statute will suffer from concerns about its legitimacy within the 
administrative tribunal community.   
 There are ten main documents that ATAGAA requires tribunals to prepare.24 An 
examination of the language surrounding each one suggests that the legislature still 
views some of the matters with which the documents deal as areas governed by 
tribunal discretion, irrespective of the statute’s oversight. For instance, each 
adjudicative tribunal to which ATAGAA applies is required to indicate the standard 
of service "that the tribunal intends to provide"25. Similarly, it is difficult to see how a 
tribunal mission statement26 could be created by the legislature, as mission statements 
are generally auto-reflective documents that project the values and aspirations 
developed at the tribunal level.27 These elements of ATAGAA suggest that the statute 
                                                          
24  These are the : mandate statement (ss. 2(a)), mission statement (ss. 2(b)), consultation policy (s. 4), 
 member accountability framework (s. 7), service standard policy (s. 5), ethics plan (s. 6), business 
 plan (s. 12), annual report (s. 13), memorandum of understanding (s. 11) and review and amendments 
 to the public accountability documents (ss. 9-10).  
25  See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at ss. 5(2). 
26  See Ibid at ss. 3(2)(b). 
27  Similarly, the consultation policy required by the tribunal is dependent on the tribunal chair’s opinion 
 as to who should be consulted. See Ibid at ss. 4(2). 
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aims to preserve areas of tribunal discretion that fall commonly within the realm of 
administrative independence28 while simultaneously permitting responsible ministers 
the right to supervise these discretionary realms.29 In light of this, it is not surprising 
that concerns have already been raised by members of the administrative justice 
community.30 
 Caution should therefore be taken so that approval by the responsible minister, 
which is required for most of the accountability instruments, does not disintegrate 
into a command and control exercise over the tribunal’s internal governance.  Many 
of the spheres that the statute has now entered were previously fully within the 
tribunal's administrative control at common law.  These include its decisions relating 
to staffing, training, codes of conduct, service standards and many others.  It can be 
useful to have ministerial input, particularly where this might bring about a more 
levelled approach to accountability issues among the various adjudicative tribunals in 
the province.31 There may be administrative tribunals who currently have few 
accountability mechanisms in place and others who have already put much time and 
effort into transparency and accountability.  It would be encouraging, however, to see 
more of a legislated commitment to guard against the possible collapse of the 
collaborative governance approach proposed in the statute into one of close executive 
control. 
 Finally, although ATAGAA aims to make administrative tribunals more 
accountable, it does not address the countervailing question of the accountability of 
government to adjudicative tribunals.  This accountability is important so that 
adjudicative tribunals can adequately serve the public. This is a particularly 
                                                          
28  Within the realm of administrative independence, it is administrative control - that is, a tribunal’s 
 decision over the daily activities its operation, including managing resources and caseload – which 
 figures most prominently here. For a discussion of the concept of administrative control, see R. v. 
 Valente [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
29  The legislature clearly has left room for the tribunal’s discretion (or the discretion of the tribunal 
 chair) yet also required ministerial approval for the following documents: the service standard policy 
 (see, in particular ss. 5(2) (a)), the consultation policy (s. 4), review and amendment of public 
 accountability documents (ss. 9-10). By contrast, the legislatures are quite unequivocal in indicating 
 the documents for which contents shall be prescribed. These are: the ethics plan (s.6), the business 
 plan (s. 12) and the annual report (s. 13). For these documents, it seems clear that the legislature 
 believes that it could have created legislation on the matter. Finally, there is a gray zone of 
 subjects over which the legislature could take full responsibility but it is not clear from reading the 
 statute that it intended to do so. These include the mandate statement (s. 3) and the member 
 accountability framework (s. 7). The memorandum of understanding (s. 11) is by nature a document 
 of shared responsibility between the tribunal and the responsible minister. 
30  See e.g. Ontario Bar Association, “Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 
 2009-Cause for Concern: The Independence Issue” (August 25, 2010), online: Ontario Bar 
 Association <http://www.oba.org/En/publicaffairs_en/Submissions/Submissions.aspx>. The 
 author discloses being a member of the committee that drafted the report. Some may argue that a 
 responsible minister should have the control of items such as mission statements and consultation 
 policies as part of his or her portfolio. It is hard to reconcile this view of the minister's role, however, 
 with the understanding of an administrative tribunal as an arm's-length agency that is independent  of 
 government. As an independent, arm's-length body, the tribunal has been removed from the 
 departments of the executive government and charged with overseeing the management of an 
 industry or sector through its understanding of its enabling statute and its expertise. Documents such 
 as a mission statement or consultation policy emerge from an understanding of the legislation and the 
 day-to-day dealings with the industry or sector that develop over time. Given that the minister is 
 removed from this day-to-day work, it is hard to see how his or her view of documents emerging 
 from a mixture of statutory interpretation and daily tribunal operation can be more appropriate 
 than the perspective of the tribunal itself. 
31  ATAGAA currently applies to 37 tribunals in Ontario. The tribunals are listed in the regulation: 
 General O. Reg. 126/10. 
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unfortunate failing of the accountability statute.  Many concerns about government 
accountability to administrative tribunals speak directly to tribunal independence.  If 
the legislation had engaged with concerns such as the removal of appointees and 
budgetary resources, it would have shown a much stronger commitment to balancing 
accountability and independence in the often politicized operational context of the 
administrative state.  I turn next to a more detailed discussion of the nature of the 
Canadian administrative state, the values of accountability and independence, and the 
tense relationship between them, in an effort to show where ATAGAA needs to be 
strengthened in order to be a truly effective accountability statute. 
 
III. DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE  
 
A. Institutional Framework - The Canadian Administrative State 
 To situate the discussion, it is useful to have a better sense of the bodies with 
which ATAGAA is concerned.   Broadly speaking, the Canadian administrative state 
refers to the collection of administrative boards, agencies, commissions, tribunals and 
other similar bodies established at arm’s length from the federal, provincial or 
territorial executive branch of government. These bodies generally receive their 
mandates through legislation32 and their purpose is to help implement government 
policies and programs.  The administrative state aims to “provide a forum that is 
more specialized, less costly and easier to use than the courts.”33  
 Administrative bodies are said to be "independent" because of the absence of 
close control over their decision-making by the executive branch of government. 
"Independence,” however, does not indicate a total lack of connection to the 
executive or legislative branches of government.  On the contrary, administrative 
bodies usually have a designated Minister of Cabinet who is responsible for reporting 
on their activities to the legislature.  The responsible minister also tends to be 
involved in the appointment of members of the administrative agency and its chair.  
With respect to legislative connections, administrative bodies are susceptible to 
having their mandates, structures, and other aspects of their work modified through 
the legislative process. They may even be abolished through legislative enactment or 
repeal.34  
 One thing that is clear about the Canadian administrative state is that the term 
“administrative body” can refer to a wide variety of administrative actors.  These 
actors may vary in their decision-making output.  For example, they may produce 
binding orders (e.g. human rights tribunals), non-binding recommendations (e.g. 
provincial ombudsman), policy reports (e.g. Royal Commissions) or no reports at all 
                                                          
32  Non-statutory administrative bodies also exist although they are less common. An example is the 
 Anishinabek Police Services, which is an autonomous, self-governing First Nations police service 
 created by agreement among the federal government, the Ontario Government and a number of First 
 Nations groups (the Anishinabek Police Service Agreement 1992). See the discussion of the 
 Anishinabek Police Service in McDonald v. Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 53 C.C.E.L. (3d) 126. Non-
 statutory administrative bodies are generally described as being created through Crown (executive) 
 prerogative. 
33  Ontario, Everyday Justice: Report of the Agency Reform Commission on Ontario’s Regulatory and Adjudicative 
 Agencies (Toronto:  Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1998) at 3. 
34  See e.g. Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 in which a member of a public utilities board lost 
 his position and pension rights when the Newfoundland government restructured the board and 
 terminated his appointment. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the member was entitled to 
 compensation from the government for the breach of its obligations. 
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(e.g. a body with no statutory duty to give reasons may refrain from doing so35).  
Administrative bodies are also not distinguished by the nature of the disputes they 
hear. They hear disputes between private parties (e.g. labour boards), between 
individuals and government (e.g. social benefit tribunals) or larger polycentric matters 
that address issues such as government planning and energy distribution. External 
structure is yet another factor that is not consistent among administrative bodies.  
Although most are created as extensions of the executive branch of government, 
some are agents of the legislature.36  Similarly, the structure of administrative bodies 
may range from multimember organizations to a single cabinet minister.37  The 
appointment process and terms of appointment may also cover a broad range of 
options, varying as to whether all of the political parties have a say in the appointment 
of the chair or members or whether it is an appointment by the government of the 
day; whether the appointment is for a fixed length of time or is an appointment at the 
pleasure of the government; and whether there is a statutory procedure for removing 
an appointee.38  As for the internal structure of administrative tribunals, this element 
often depends on the discretion of the chair of the agency in conjunction with those 
who work there.  The internal organization of administrative bodies (e.g. how many 
departments there are, how the departments will divide the work, etc.) is not uniform, 
owing largely to the differences in function of various tribunals. Even tribunals with 
similar policy goals across the country may have very different internal structures.  
Empirical evidence shows that the internal structure and internal culture (the norms 
or ethos that guide the work that is done at the tribunal) similarly manifest themselves 
in large variety.39                                                                                                          
 Finally, the procedures of administrative bodies may be vastly different. Some 
administrative bodies have court-like processes, others may decide disputes in a much 
less formal manner, still others may provide the opportunity to be heard through a 
written hearing and some employ inquiry powers.    Reflective of this broad and 
seemingly unwieldly array is that among the many official names for administrative 
actors, one will find “agencies,” “boards,” “commissions,” and “tribunals” although 
no one name denotes any particular mixture of decision-making output, nature of 
dispute, structure  or procedure.   
                                                          
35  However, the common law duty to give reasons may apply if the decision will have a significant 
 impact on the individual(s) affected. See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
36  The most typical examples of administrative actors that have been established as officers of the 
 legislature are the ombudsman, which exist in nine of the provinces and territories, and access to 
 information and privacy commissioners which exist in eleven provinces and territories as well as at 
 the federal level.  See e.g. the Ontario Ombudsman Act R.S.O. 1990, c. O.6 and the Freedom of 
 Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165. 
37  See generally on the wide definition of the term “administrative actor,” W. A. Bogart, "The Tools of 
 the Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix" in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 
 Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) [Administrative Law in Context]. 
38   Terms of appointment and removal may require a formal review by Parliament or the legislature and 
 approval by a percentage of Parliament or the legislature.  See e.g. An Act respecting Access to documents 
 held by public bodies and the protection of personal information, RSQ c A-2.1, ss. 104, 107 which indicates that 
 a member of Québec's access to information and privacy commission may be appointed and 
 dismissed only on a resolution of the legislature that is approved by not less than two-thirds of the 
 Québec legislative assembly. Most administrative contexts do not require such formal review.   
39  Laverne Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence at the “Tribunal” Level: An Ethnographic Study of 
 Access to Information and Privacy Commissions in Canada (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, Osgoode 
 Hall Law School, 2009) [unpublished] [Fashioning Administrative Independence]. 
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 A few distinct responses to the diversity of the administrative state have emerged 
in administrative law theory.  The courts, certain legal academics and some 
commentators have developed a classification of administrative bodies according to 
their degree of resemblance to the courts.  This school of thought proposes that 
administrative bodies should be conceived as running along a spectrum. 40   
Considered to be at the adjudicative end of the spectrum are administrative actors 
that make decisions affecting individual rights, that serve primarily to determine a lis 
between parties by adjudicators who are appointed by government and then chosen 
by the chair to preside alone or on panels, and that employ procedures that are quasi-
judicial nature (i.e. that involve oral hearings, the exchange of evidence, submission of 
legal argument, etc.).  The spectrum theory maintains that adjudicative bodies should 
provide the highest degree of procedural fairness for the parties who appear before 
them.41 Some also maintain that the expression “tribunal” be reserved for bodies that 
fit this end of the spectrum.42  At the opposite end of the spectrum are administrative 
bodies that primarily produce governmental policy.  These bodies may hear from a 
multitude of perspectives in determining how government should act in cases that are 
not individual but systemic.  Individuals appearing before policy oriented bodies are 
said to require less procedural fairness.  Between the two polar ends of the spectrum 
run a range of tribunals that vary in their mixture of policy and adjudicative functions. 
The spectrum approach to categorizing the actors of the administrative state has 
captured the attention of certain policymakers. Indeed, in some jurisdictions such as 
Ontario, these concepts have been adopted as organizational tools. The Public 
Appointments Secretariat of Ontario, for example, classifies agencies into eight 
different types, drawing distinctions, among other things, between “advisory 
agencies" which create policy and "adjudicative agencies" which are quasi-judicial 
dispute resolution bodies.43  
 The spectrum school of thought has been challenged by those who argue for a 
less disaggregated understanding of the work of administrative bodies.  In its most 
robust form, the theory put forth by these scholars maintains that instead of focusing 
on what appears to be the most dominant function that an administrative body 
performs, a more authentic understanding of the administrative state would 
                                                          
40  See e.g.  David J. Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals:  Their Evolution in Canada from 1945 to 1984” 
 in Ivan Bernier and Andrée Lajoie, eds,  Regulations, Crown Corporations and Administrative Tribunals 
 (Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 48) 
 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Canadian Bar Association, Task Force Report, 
 Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies in Canada (Ottawa:   Canadian Bar 
 Association, 1990) (Chair:  Edward Ratushny, Q.C.); Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees 
 Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884 [Bell Canada]. That the notion of a spectrum underpins much 
 administrative law theory can be gleaned from authors who seek to build upon the theory such as S. 
 Ronald Ellis, "The Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals Part I” (2006) 19 Can J Admin L & Prac 
 303, and others who denounce the theory such as Roderick A. Macdonald, “The Acoustics of 
 Accountability: Towards Well-Tempered Tribunals” chapter 6 in András Sajó (ed.) Judicial Integrity 
 (Leiden:  M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 141-180.  
41  See e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada’s assertions to this effect in Bell Canada, ibid. and in
 Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623. 
42  See e.g. the use of the term in Kaye Joachim, "New Models in Administrative Hearings: The Human 
 Rights Tribunal of Ontario" in Ronalda Murphy & Patrick A. Molinari, eds, Doing Justice: Dispute 
 Resolution in the Courts and Beyond (Montréal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009) 
 at 87-110. 
43  See "What Is an Agency" online: Ontario Public Appointments Secretariat <https://www.pa s.gov.
 on.ca/scripts/en/general-Info.asp>. Similarly, in Québec, the word "tribunal" is reserved for 
 designated entities including "any person or agency exercising quasi judicial functions.”  
 See Charter of human rights and freedoms R.S.Q., c. C-12 at ss. 56.  
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acknowledge that every administrative body performs a range of tasks, often 
incorporating some form of decision-making, policy-making and many other 
functions such as investigation, education, auditing etc..44   The implications of this 
approach are felt most significantly when considering the issues of procedural fairness 
and accountability.  Those who critique the spectrum approach, are generally wary of 
associating degrees of procedural fairness and accountability with only the most 
dominant function of an administrative body. Instead, they propose that issues such 
as procedural fairness and accountability are best addressed through a close 
understanding of the nature and work of each individual agency. Most recently, there 
has also been emerging literature which posits that each agency's internal culture and 
informal normative order can play a significant role in establishing barometers for 
fairness and accountability.45 
 Quite in conformity with Ontario’s general adoption of the spectrum theory, 
ATAGAA’s focus is on adjudicative tribunals.  The statute itself does not define 
"adjudicative tribunals;" rather, the administrative bodies to which it applies are 
named in a schedule.46   
 
B. The Concepts of Administrative Accountability and Independence   
 The aim of the ATAGAA, 2009 is to strike an appropriate balance between 
accountability measures imposed on adjudicative tribunals and non-interference with 
the tribunal’s decision-making. The desire to strike this balance is reflected in the 
Act’s first section which reads: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that adjudicative tribunals are 
accountable, transparent and efficient in their operations while 
remaining independent in their decision-making.47 
 
The public and the administrative tribunal community have expressed an enormous 
amount of concern over the accountability and independence of administrative 
actors.48 Accountability speaks to the requirement that an agency and its members 
show responsibility for their actions.  A general understanding is that there should be 
some way to ensure that administrative actors are not misusing public funds and that 
they are using their resources efficiently.  The notion of administrative accountability 
extends past financial and timeliness concerns, however, to address other qualitatively 
important areas such as the ethics, subject-matter competency and performance 
results of appointees.  The central questions surrounding accountability are:  to whom 
should an administrative body and its members be held accountable? For what 
                                                          
44  See Macdonald, supra note 40. 
45  See Macdonald, ibid.; Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence, supra note 39.   
46  See ATAGAA, supra note 1, s. 2 and Ontario Reg. 126/10. 
47  ATAGAA, supra note 1. 
48  There have been numerous reports written on reforming the administrative justice system that touch 
 on accountability and independence. In Ontario, these reports include: Directions:  Review of Ontario’s 
 Regulatory Agencies (Report prepared for the Management Board of Cabinet) (Toronto:  Queen’s 
 Printer for Ontario, 1989) (Chair:  Robert Macaulay) and Everyday Justice, supra note 33.  There have 
 also been documents produced by tribunal member  associations dedicated to professionalization and 
 professional development that address these issues from a tribunal perspective. See e.g. British 
 Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals, Report on Independence, Accountability And Appointment 
 Processes In British Columbia Tribunals, British Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals Policy and Research 
 Committee Report by Philip Bryden and Ron Hatch, 2009, online: British Columbia Council of 
 Administrative Tribunals <http://www.bccat.net/assets/downloads/indrep.pdf>. 
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activities should they be held accountable? And through what mechanisms should 
accountability be measured?     
 Ensuring that the tools used to garner accountability do not simultaneously 
infringe on the administrative actor’s independence is another crucial concern that 
arises often in the context of Canadian administrative law and policy. The concept of 
administrative independence refers to safeguarding decision-makers from improper 
interference or influence. The theory goes that by ensuring this freedom, there is a 
greater likelihood that decisions will be based solely on the law and evidence.  
Independence is therefore a tool for guaranteeing impartiality.  Placed in the context 
of arm’s length administrative bodies, independence is usually considered in light of 
the degree to which adjudicators have the promise of security of tenure, financial 
security, institutional control and freedom in their adjudicative deliberations.  
Interference by the executive branch of government, another tribunal member, staff, 
litigants or any other entity is held to arise when a reasonable person would perceive 
one or more of these factors to be compromised.49   Regardless of what the reality 
may be, the reasonable person test requires only that a reasonable perception of lack 
of independence exist for there to be a breach of procedural fairness.50  As well, while 
the factors of security of tenure, financial security, institutional control and 
adjudicative independence are similar for both the judiciary and administrative bodies, 
a key distinction between judicial and administrative independence is that the degree 
to which independence is required for administrative bodies can vary, depending on 
the intention of the legislature and the institution’s nature and functions.
51 
 
IV. EXPLORING TENSIONS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE: ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
 
 Situations in which accountability and independence conflict often stem from the 
de facto development of on-the-ground relationships between the administrative body 
and the branch of government to which it is required to report; they may also arise 
between members of the administrative body itself.  To demonstrate how conflicts 
between accountability and independence emerge, I use the three central questions 
identified earlier – namely, “accountability to whom?” “accountability for which 
activities?” and “accountability  through what measures?” as a framework for 
examining illustrative examples  of problems  that have occurred recently in the 
jurisprudence or on the ground.  These illustrations also serve as a backdrop to my 
analysis of ATAGAA’s potential as an administrative accountability tool.  I argue 
that ATAGAA could be a statute of greater impact if it were to draw on lessons 
learned from these past situations.        
 
 
                                                          
49  See the seminal cases of R. v. Valente, supra note 28 at paras. 24-26 and Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 
 S.C.R. 56 at para. 21. On the test for reasonable perception of partiality, see Committee for Justice and 
 Liberty v. National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394-5. The test, although formulated in dissent, 
 has since been applied consistently by the Supreme Court as the appropriate approach to be taken. 
50  For greater discussion of the concept of independence, see Laverne Jacobs, “Independence, 
 Impartiality and Bias” in Administrative Law in Context, supra note 37 and Laverne Jacobs, “Tribunal 
 Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel: A Call for 
 Empirical Analysis” in Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. Mactavish., eds., Dialogue Between Courts 
 and Tribunals: Essays in Administrative Law and Justice (2001-2007) (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 
 2008) at 43-66. 
51  See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Gen. Manager Liquor Control), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781. 
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A. Administrative Accountability: Accountability to whom? 
 Administrative actors are generally said to be accountable to four entities: to the 
branch of government through which they report to the legislature,52 to the legislature 
itself, to the public, and to themselves.  The first of these contexts has offered the 
most challenge in the jurisprudence and on the ground.  
 
1. Accountability to the executive branch of government   
 As for accountability to government, ATAGAA’s framework does not capture 
some of the most problematic situations.  Such circumstances of accountability have 
arisen when the executive branch of government has attempted to assume control 
over the administrative body’s decisions. These instances raise the delicate question: 
to whom is the agency rightfully accountable? In these cases, authority for the 
interference by the minister or the executive branch of government can seldom be 
linked legitimately to a legislative enactment.  Frequently, legislation has been misused 
in a thinly disguised attempt to assert executive control; alternatively, the 
inappropriate situation arises simply from an informal, on-the-ground relationship 
that an agency and the executive have developed. 
 One of the sharpest examples of attempted executive control occurred in 2007 
when the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Linda Keen, was 
removed from her position following a decision that had plainly displeased the 
Minister of Natural Resources.53  The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission regulates 
all nuclear facilities and activities in Canada with the purpose of ensuring their 
compliance with health, safety, security and environmental standards as well as 
fulfilment of Canada's international obligations.54 In 2007, the Commission decided to 
keep closed a nuclear power plant that had been temporarily shut down for routine 
maintenance because of its failure to meet safety standards. This nuclear reactor, 
however, was also a primary source for the production of medical isotopes used in 
health care in the country and around the world.  The closure therefore caused a 
shortage of isotopes.  Eventually, in order to circumvent the effects of this decision, 
Parliament enacted legislation reopening the reactor. This was an appropriate legal 
avenue to take given the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.  This legislative step 
was taken, however, only after the Minister had attempted to use other means to 
influence the President and Commission’s decision. 
 The chronology set out by the Federal Court in Keen indicates that the Minister 
participated in a Saturday conference call with the President and members of the 
Commission in which he requested a hearing be convened immediately in order to 
approve the restart of the reactor.55  This followed a prior conference call between the 
Minister, the Commission and the operators of the reactor at which the Minister 
urged the Commission and the licensee to work together to resolve the issue.  Finally, 
the Minister took advantage of a directive power provided in the Commission's 
enabling statute to craft a directive that appeared specifically tailored, by its wording 
and timing, to force the Commission to decide in favour of the licensee. Under the 
enabling statute, the directive power allows only for directives of "general application 
                                                          
52  I will use the term "legislature" to denote both provincial legislatures and the federal parliament for 
 ease of convenience.    
53  See Keen v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. no.  402 [Keen]. 
54  See Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9, s. 9. More information about the Canadian Nuclear 
 Safety Commission can also be found online: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
 <http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/>.  
55  See Keen, supra note 53. 
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on broad policy matters" to be issued to the Commission.56 Yet, this directive, which 
was prepared by the Minister two days after the Saturday conference call, required the 
Commission to take into account “the health of Canadians who, for medical 
purposes, depend on nuclear substances produced by nuclear reactors” in the course 
of its regulation.57  In light of the ongoing live litigation, one could argue that it was 
invalidly created. The Bill requiring the reactor to be reopened was enacted the next 
day and was enacted before the President of the Commission had even received the 
directive. 
 About two weeks after all of these events had occurred, the Minister wrote to the 
President of the Commission, asking her to explain why certain evidence had not 
been taken into account in the Commission's decision-making and why the directive 
issued by his office had been ignored.58  He also expressed disappointment in her 
leadership of the Commission and indicated a loss of confidence in her abilities.  
Finally, his letter indicated that he was considering asking for her removal as 
President before her term was up.59  This, in fact, is what eventually happened.  
Although she responded to the Minister's letter, Ms. Keen was removed by Order-in-
Council before she had an opportunity to respond to the concerns at a Parliamentary 
investigation set up for this purpose.  Her removal was upheld on judicial review in 
the Federal Court.60  
 Overall, the Minister's interaction with Ms. Keen was set in tones that revealed a 
strong misperception of the relationship between his office and the Commission.  
While the Minister is responsible for reporting to Parliament on behalf of the 
Commission, the Commission as an arm’s length independent body is not responsible 
for accounting to the Minister for the decisions that it makes. One of the reasons for 
the establishment of administrative tribunals was to remove political influences on 
decision-making, leaving decision-making to those with expertise in a particular 
subject matter.  Even if the Commission's decision had inappropriately overlooked 
evidence, that was a matter for judicial review, not for review by the executive branch 
of government.  There were no provisions for any type of review by the executive in 
the Commission's enabling statute. Finally, it is plain that there may be situations 
where it is in the public interest to remove the head or a member of an administrative 
tribunal. It would be more appropriate, however, for the parameters surrounding 
                                                          
56  With respect to directives from Cabinet to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, s. 19 is the 
 relevant provision.  It reads: 
 
DIRECTIVES 
19.  1) The Governor in Council may, by order, issue to the Commission 
 directives of general application on broad policy matters with respect to 
 the objects of the Commission. 
 (2) An order made under this section is binding on the Commission. 
 (3) A copy of each order made under this section shall be 
  (a) published in the Canada Gazette; and 
  (b) laid before each House of Parliament. 
 
57  See Keen, supra note 53 at para. 25. 
58  See Letter from Minister Lunn to Linda Keen (on file with author) and partial reproduction of the 
 letter in Keen, ibid at para.  29. 
59  See Keen, ibid. 
60 Ibid. The Federal Court held that Ms. Keen’s appointment as President was an at pleasure 
 appointment and that her opportunity to respond to the minister's letter satisfied any procedural 
 fairness obligation that may have been owed to her. 
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removal to be governed clearly by legislation or memoranda of understanding that 
has put a process in place proscriptively.  
 In Keen, the Minister simply took it upon himself to get involved in the 
Commission's decision-making process on this one particular file. This is an example 
of what I earlier described as a de facto relationship that developed on the ground. It is 
not the only instance in which there has been a clash between the executive branch of 
government and an administrative body over decisions made by a tribunal.61 
Unfortunately, these improper callings to account undermine confidence in the 
government of the day and generate confusion over what is and is not appropriate 
behaviour for the tribunal (i.e. should the President of the Nuclear Safety 
Commission have had medical treatment as a top priority in considering what to do 
about the unsafe reactor?) which can also affect public confidence in the 
administrative justice system.  
 If a situation like this were to occur in Ontario, ATAGAA might offer some 
recourse but only if management at an astute tribunal had found a way to incorporate 
preventive measures in a memorandum of understanding that gained approval by the 
responsible minister. What is clear is that the legislative branch of government in 
Ontario has not taken it upon itself to flag this type of behaviour as an issue.  It has 
not highlighted possible attempts by the executive branch of government to interfere 
with tribunal decision-making under the guise of tribunal accountability to the 
executive as a concern – even though the stated purpose of the Act is to increase 
administrative accountability while avoiding conflict between accountability and 
independence.   
 
2. Accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative 
tribunals 
 In what ways can a lack of accountability by the executive branch of government 
hinder the work of administrative tribunals? Accountability on the part of the 
executive branch of government implies respecting the express or implied 
commitments that host ministries have towards their arm’s length agencies and 
fulfilling them in good faith. The ultimate concern that the public be adequately 
served by administrative tribunals depends on the fulfillment of such commitments. 
Building on the discussion of removals from the last section, one should note that 
even in circumstances when a chair or member of a tribunal has been statutorily 
removed through non-renewal of his or her term of appointment, one may wonder if 
ministerial discretion has been exercised in good faith.  An example that speaks well 
to this idea deals with the Military Police Complaints Commission, an administrative 
body which has been prominent in the media of late.62 A second example examines 
the detrimental effects of providing insufficient budgetary resources through a look at 
a recent situation with the Commission for Public Complaints against the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]. 
 
 
                                                          
61  See generally Lorne Sossin, "The Puzzle of Independence" (2009) 26 NJCL 1 in which he discusses 
 some of the major incidents in recent years. 
62  Another example that deals with the removal of tribunal members relates to the Saskatchewan 
 Labour Relations Board. However, in the Saskatchewan case, legislation had been enacted that 
 explicitly allowed for the changing of tribunal members upon the election of a new government.  See 
 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General, Department of Advanced Education, 
 Employment and Labour) 2010 SKCA 27, aff’g 2009 SKQB 20. 
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(a) Military Police Complaints Commission 
 The Military Police Complaints Commission [MPCC] is a federal adjudicative 
administrative tribunal.  Its mandate is to provide civilian oversight of police matters 
by investigating complaints made about the conduct of military police, to hold public 
hearings, to report on its findings, and make recommendations to senior officers in 
the Canadian Forces, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and/or the Minister 
of National Defence.63 
 Peter Tinsley chaired the MPCC from September 12, 2005 to December 12, 2009.  
When his appointment, which was for a four-year term, ended, it was not renewed. 
During the time of his appointment, he was instrumental in having an investigation 
started into the question of whether the Canadian Forces had transferred detainees to 
Afghanistan despite the risk of torture.  The federal government, which was a 
respondent to the allegations, refused to cooperate in providing the relevant 
documents for the hearing to proceed, claiming national security privilege.  This led 
to a protracted ongoing debate.64 A new chair, Glenn Stannard, was appointed to 
continue the hearing.  Yet, his appointment raised questions about continuity of the 
process as he had not participated in the initial part of the proceedings.65 He also did 
not have the legal background that the former chair possessed. 
 The fact that the government of the day was both in charge of the appointment 
and removal process for members of the MPCC and concurrently appearing as a 
party before the MPCC, cast doubt over the neutrality of Cabinet in replacing Mr. 
Tinsley.  Even if Cabinet’s actions were legal under the enabling legislation, a 
reasonable person who takes into account the battle that the MPCC has had to obtain 
the relevant documents from the government party, including being taken on judicial 
review, may have a reasonable apprehension of bias. Circumstances seem even more 
unusual, when one takes into account that the new chair has no legal training, in 
contrast to Mr. Tinsley.   
 It seems that in cases such as these where the independence of the decision-
making body has the potential to be influenced indirectly, it would be best to have a 
mechanism put in place that helps neutralize the reappointment process.  In this 
regard, ATAGAA shows a positive, first step.  One recalls that ATAGAA requires 
the executive to seek the chair’s recommendation of members who are up for 
reappointment.  In this way, ATAGAA shows a commitment to shared governance 
in the appointments process.  However, a fuller commitment would also provide the 
tribunal with the opportunity to give input when the executive branch of government 
is considering whether to reappoint the current chair. This input could be given by a 
                                                          
63  See National Defence Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, Part IV. More information about the Military Police 
 Complaints Commission can also be found online:  Military Police Complaints Commission 
 <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca>. 
64  At the time of writing, hearings had resumed with a new Chair at the helm. As for the history of the 
 proceedings, on Oct. 30, 2008, the government filed for judicial review, arguing that the MPCC did 
 not have jurisdiction over general military operations but only over “policing duties and functions.”  
 It argued that transferring detainees was a general military operation and therefore not subject to 
 scrutiny by the Commission. On March 24, 2010, the Commission ruled that the hearings would 
 continue.  The new Chair, Glenn Stannard, who had been interim chair after Peter Tinsley's 
 appointment was not renewed, was appointed to this position on May 14, 2010.  A parallel 
 proceeding in Parliament is also taking place which currently has led to the sharing of the relevant 
 documents amongst a contingent of members of Parliament who represent all parties in the House of 
 Commons. 
65  See transcript of proceedings, October 14, 2009, which lists those present at the hearings, available 
 online: Military Police Complaints Commission <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/300/afghan/index-
 eng.aspx>. 
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designated committee of the tribunal and could be offered automatically whenever a 
chair's term faces the possibility of renewal under the enabling legislation. A further 
useful procedure could be to require that reasons be given by the executive branch of 
government on the replacement or reappointment of the chair.  This would offer 
greater transparency and accountability to the process. Reasons would also assist if 
judicial review were sought of the executive’s decision.  Again, while ATAGAA 
shows the beginning of a collaborative governance approach, strengthening the 
legislation in this way would provide a more engaged commitment to accountability 
by both the tribunals and the executive branch of government. It may also stave off 
some of the ill-effects that have already occurred to the public’s confidence in the 
administrative state. 
 
(b) Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP 
 A second brief example relating to the accountability of the executive to 
administrative tribunals concerns the obligation to provide sufficient funding for 
tribunals to do their work.  Although it may seem obvious, situations have occurred 
in which funding has been removed part way through a project, causing the project to 
be disbanded.  This occurred recently to the Commission for Complaints against the 
RCMP [Commission] which is a federal oversight body that takes complaints against 
the RCMP. The Commission conducts investigations and also has research and 
policy-making functions.66 After several tragic incidents had occurred involving the 
use of conducted energy weapons (or "tasers") by RCMP officers, the Commission 
initiated an inquiry into taser use by the RCMP.  It received money from the 
government for a long-term study and produced two reports. However, its funding 
was cut quite suddenly in 2009. Some commentators have linked the funding cut to 
the critical stance that the Commission has taken of the RCMP.67 Regardless of 
whether some sort of reprisal might have been involved, the point is that by not 
living up to its funding commitment and not explaining itself, the government 
engendered a loss of public confidence in the administrative justice system.  
 ATAGAA may not speak directly to the specifics of ensuring budgetary 
resources but it does require the "financial, staffing and administrative arrangements 
for the tribunal"68 to be addressed in a memorandum of understanding with the 
responsible minister. This is definitely a useful step that can be further developed by 
tribunals and ministers on a case-by-case basis.  It will be up to the tribunals to ensure 
that they have sufficient resources and it would be wise for them to create measures 
that allow them to receive additional resources easily should they find themselves 
short in the middle of a fiscal year.  Ideally, having a clear and transparent mechanism 
in place should also avoid potential apprehensions of inappropriate contact, especially 
when the government is a party before the tribunal or somehow subject to the 
tribunal’s scrutiny. 
 
 
                                                          
66  See Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act R.S.C., 1985 c. R-10, Part VI. Section 45.32 of the RCMP Act 
 addresses the duties of the commission.  However, these duties are set in very broad parameters.  
 There is no specific indication of all duties in the statute. 
67  See e.g. “Report slams RCMP in airport Taser death,” CBC News (8 December 2009) online: CBC 
 news <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/12/08/bc-kennedy-vancouver-
 airport-taserreport.html#ixzz0iwj7uv4d>. 
68  ATAGAA, supra note 1. ss.11 (2). 
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B. Administrative Accountability: Accountability for what Activities?69 
 Do administrative tribunals have an obligation to provide feedback to the 
executive branch of government about how the legislation it administers has been 
faring?  This question speaks to the very nature and purpose of administrative 
tribunals.  In Ocean Port Hotel, the Supreme Court of Canada held that administrative 
tribunals exist primarily to implement the policies of the executive branch of 
government.  As Chief Justice McLachlin held in discussing the distinction between 
administrative tribunals and courts, "[a]dministrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this 
constitutional distinction from the executive. They are, in fact, created precisely for 
the purpose of implementing government policy.”
70  
 If tribunals are created to further the policies of the executive branch of 
government as set out in legislation, it would seem sensible that establishing channels 
of feedback to the executive on the success and challenges of the legislation should 
not be problematic.  However, this issue came to a head in 2004 when the Alberta 
government sought the input of the Alberta Labour Relations Board on legislative 
amendments that it was making to the Alberta Labour Relations Code.71 In the case of 
Communications, Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada, Local 707 v. Alberta (Labour 
Relations Board)72 several unions and the Alberta Federation of Labour applied for 
judicial review alleging that there had been inappropriate contact between the 
executive branch of government and the labour board.  The unions believed that the 
legislative changes had a negative impact on collective bargaining rights.  Further 
complicating matters was that the legislation had been developed by the government 
in what seemed to be a shroud of secrecy, as there was no consultation with the 
unions. 
 The fact that the executive branch of government had consulted with the labour 
board during the creation of the legislative amendments was not revealed directly to 
the unions.  The unions and the Federation of Labour discovered what had occurred 
by way of freedom of information requests.  The scope of the application for judicial 
review was also unusual - the applicants sought certiorari of all current and future 
decisions pertaining to the legislation. The ground of review invoked was reasonable 
perception of insufficient independence and impartiality on the part of the Board vis-
à-vis the executive. 
 The Alberta Queen's Bench held that the consultation did not give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension that the Board lacked independence or impartiality in its 
decision-making.  The court fixed particularly on the fact that there were no live cases 
dealing with the legislation taking place at the time of the consultation.  This was not 
enough for the Alberta Federation of Labour, however, which understandably 
suffered a grave loss of confidence in the Alberta labour relations regime. In the end, 
the Labour Board developed guidelines setting ground rules for any future legislative 
consultations it may have with the executive.73  The guidelines touch both on the 
                                                          
69  This section draws from an earlier work – see Laverne Jacobs, "Reconciling Independence and 
 Expertise within the Expert Multifunctional Tribunal" (unpublished paper). 
70  Ocean Port Hotel, supra note 51 at para. 24.  See also Bell Canada, supra note 40, in which the Supreme 
 Court of Canada attempted to classify certain tribunals as having greater or lesser policy-making 
 functions. 
71  R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1. 
72  2004 ABQB 63. 
73  See Alberta Labour Relations Board, Labour Relations Board Guidelines for Consultation on Legislation (29 
 March, 2007). 
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process that will be taken in its relationship with the executive and to the ways in 
which affected parties will be notified. 
 There is certainly a legitimate role for administrative tribunals to play in the 
ongoing development of the legislation they administer. Nonetheless, they should be 
accountable to their public users for the manner in which they interact with the 
executive branch of government on legislative consultations. Lessons can be learned 
from the guidelines developed by the Alberta Labour Relations Board. The guidelines 
stress the importance of using legislated channels, such as any provisions that may 
exist in enabling legislation allowing for the Minister to ask the tribunal to conduct 
research on a specific matter, before turning to informal contact.74 The guidelines also 
emphasize transparency and provide that consultation responses will be made 
publicly available.75 The fact of consultation will equally be revealed by any member 
who was involved at the beginning of a hearing in which the legislation is at issue so 
that the parties may decide if the board member’s recusal is necessary.
76 At the 
moment, ATAGAA deals only with consultation between a tribunal and public users 
with respect to changes in policies and procedures.  Given that the enabling 
legislation for various tribunals may be piecemeal in addressing the concerns that 
arise around consultation between the executive branch of government and an 
administrative tribunal on legislative changes, it would be helpful for ATAGAA to 
incorporate some of the guidance from the Alberta Labour Relations Board 
experience.  
 
C. Administrative Accountability: Through what Measures? 
 The discussion thus far has looked at the potential misuse of de facto relationships 
that develop between a tribunal and the executive branch of government.  This final 
section considers de facto relationships of accountability that may emerge between the 
chair of the tribunal and tribunal members and considers ways to safeguard against 
the encroachment on adjudicative independence that could arise.  A particular way 
that this challenge has occurred in Canadian administrative law jurisprudence is 
through the use of internal performance evaluations. 
 Outside of asking for reasons for a decision, there has been an increased interest 
in evaluating the performance of members through performance assessments. At 
present, some tribunal chairs conduct internal assessments of individual members, 
although there is no uniform approach to the issue.  ATAGAA speaks of an 
assessment to be done by the chair at the time when members’ appointments are up 
for renewal. This information is shared with the responsible minister. Indeed, 
reappointment cannot take place unless the chair has done this assessment and 
provided a positive recommendation to the minister.   
 However, problems relating to independence have occurred in the context of 
member performance evaluations. The leading case on this issue in Canada is Barreau 
de Montréal v. Québec (Procureure Générale)77 which dealt with mandatory performance 
evaluations for members of the Administrative Tribunal of Québec [TAQ] that once 
existed under the Québec Act respecting administrative justice.78  TAQ is an adjudicative 
                                                          
74  Ibid at s. 6. 
75  Ibid at s.  5. 
76  Ibid at s. 4. 
77  [2001] R.J.Q 2058 [Barreau de Montréal].  
78 R.S.Q, c. J-3 [ARAJ].  The requirement for performance evaluations before renewal has since been 
 repealed.   Members of TAQ are currently appointed for life during good behaviour and can only be 
 removed, after an inquiry, for specific reasons such as loss of qualification or permanent disability. 
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administrative appeals tribunal that hears appeals from a large number of tribunals in 
Québec. At issue was whether the performance evaluation method provided in 
TAQ’s enabling legislation contravened the requirements of an independent and 
impartial decision-making process under the Québec Charter.79  The evaluation was to 
be conducted by a committee of tribunal members that included the President of 
TAQ as well as a representative of the executive branch of government.  
 It was argued that the requirements for members of TAQ to undergo a 
performance evaluation in order to receive salary increases raised a reasonable 
perception of infringement on their security of tenure.  The concern was that having 
the head of the tribunal involved in performance evaluations could result in members 
deciding cases to please the chair instead of deciding cases in good conscience.  It was 
further argued that the presence of a government representative as a member of the 
committee responsible for conducting the appraisal gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension that the government could interfere in the adjudicative independence of 
the members.  The government is always a party before TAQ and one might perceive 
that members whose decisions do not please the government could end up being 
evaluated poorly. The court agreed with these arguments, emphasizing not only the 
apparent lack of independence, but also the fact that the statute did not provide 
members under evaluation an opportunity to be heard about the recommendations 
put forward by the committee. 
 Viewed in light of the approach adopted in ATAGAA which requires all 
members up for renewal to be evaluated by the chair, it would seem wise to take heed 
of the cautionary tale provided by the Barreau de Montréal case.  The requirement for 
an assessment before renewal should remain.  Having the tribunal's input on whether 
to renew members is obviously important to assure that competent individuals are 
appointed. At the same time, it is difficult to think of a method that can guarantee 
against members under evaluation seeking to please the evaluator. Possibly, having 
evaluations performed by an external independent body (as is currently done with 
TAQ80) may assist with the perception that decision-makers are deciding 
independently when one party before them has a connection to the evaluator.  I 
believe, however, that the most important lesson that can be taken from the Barreau de 
Montréal case is that having an opportunity to respond to recommendations to renew 
can lend accountability and transparency to the process in much the same way as was 
discussed above in relation to the removal of tribunal chairs. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Good Government Act, of which ATAGAA forms a part, was developed after 
consultation with 22 government ministries.  There is no evidence, however, that 
administrative tribunals themselves were consulted in the creation of the statute. 81 
                                                                                                                                     
 See ARAJ, ss. 51-54. An excellent overview of the history of TAQ is provided in France Houle, "A 
 Brief Historical Account of the Reforms to the Administrative Justice System in the Province of 
 Québec" (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 47. 
79   Section 23 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, applies to all quasi-
 judicial bodies in Québec.  This section reads:  “Every person has a right to a full and equal, public 
 and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and 
 obligations or of the merits of any charge brought against him.” 
80  See Houle, supra note 78 at 70-71. 
81  Both the debates in the legislative assembly as well as the background press material released by the 
 Attorney General referred to consultation with 22 government ministries.  There is no indication of 
 consultation with adjudicative tribunals. 
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Perhaps it is not surprisingly, then, that ATAGAA could have been strengthened 
through a stronger engagement with the on-the-ground concerns of administrative 
tribunals. 
 Many of the contemporary conflicts between the values of accountability and 
independence stem from de facto relationships that were developed inside 
administrative tribunals or between tribunals and government. These relationships 
have either gone wrong or there is a reasonable perception that they have gone 
wrong.  ATAGAA attempts to address the question of accountability solely by 
requiring tribunals to account to government.  ATAGAA’s failing, however, is that it 
ignores the concomitant obligation on government to be accountable to 
administrative tribunals and, by extension, to the public.82  Questions relating to the 
removal of appointees, budgetary resources, legislative consultation and performance 
evaluations are all issues for which ATAGAA shows little or no appreciation. Yet, 
they are administrative justice issues that have caused the public to lose confidence in 
the recent past.  As well, while ATAGAA is strong on sending directions to 
administrative tribunals to account, it is weak on facilitating methods for tribunal 
accountability to be fostered as an ethos at the tribunal level.  Finally, there are no 
safeguards to protect the collaborative governance approach that ATAGAA 
proposes from collapsing into one that functions through executive control. Until 
these aspects are fixed, ATAGAA will remain only a wavering commitment to the 
very concept of accountability that it promotes. 
 
                                                          
82  One could also mention that ATAGAA does not address the concern of whether administrative 
 tribunals achieve their intended purpose, an issue that is explored by Lorne Sossin and Steven 
 Hoffman in their contribution to this special issue. See "The Elusive Search for Accountability:  
 Evaluating Adjudicative Tribunals” (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just. 
